Logistics is the science of procuring, transporting, and distributing the supplies an army needs to maintain itself in and out of combat. In the modern era logistics has become quite complex, due to the large numbers of motorized vehicles and machines which armies employ.

In the pre-industrial era, however, when armies consisted almost entirely of men and horses, the logistical requirements were simpler: food for the men, fodder for the animals, ammunition for whatever missile weapons were present, and a relatively small amount, in tonnage, of replacement clothing and equipment.

The logistical capabilities of pre-industrial armies were determined primarily by two factors:

1. Pre-industrial economics were much nearer the maintenance level than our own. The fraction of the population and resources which the society had to devote to food production was much greater, and the surplus which could be spared for non-agricultural ventures was severely limited.
2. Overland transport was entirely dependent on human or animal muscle power. Therefore, as will be discussed in detail below, it was extremely difficult to deliver food, or any other massive, bulky commodity, to forces operating very far from the source of production.

These two factors shaped military logistics, and therefore military strategy, from ancient times through the Napoleonic era. Strategists were only freed from these restrictions (to be bound by others) in the second half of the nineteenth century when the industrial revolution and the development of the railroad markedly changed the nature of production and transportation .

Turning first to the problem of production, there are basically two solutions: produce the necessary materials in the home country and transport them to the army, or acquire them locally in the theater of operations .

If the materials are produced at home, production can be tailored to the projected supply requirements of the army. Thus the leaders can assure that roundshot is produced in the appropriate caliber, that uniform coats will all be of the same color, and that there actually will be 20,000 mail hauberks (or pila, or flintlocks) in existence next spring at the start of the planned offensive.

Production at home also allows a nation to accumulate a store of supplies over a long period of time, an important consideration in a near-sustenance economy. Armor and weapons could be (and were) accumulated over generations, while the excess from several harvests could be stored in state graneries to support a coming, major campaign.

There are drawbacks to home production, however. First, the army is limited to those goods and services which the home country is able to produce. Those pre-industrial armies which drew supply from their own territory were necessarily either small in relation to the population base or seasonal, the troops being agricultural workers for much of the year.

Any state which tried to field a large, standing army would soon starve the army and the civilian population as well. These limitations applied as late as the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, it has been proposed that Revolutionary France sent its armies abroad to fight (and forage) in part because of the inability of the French economy to feed its own army.

Mule Equations

A second problem with the "home production" method was that the supplies had to be transported long distances. This transportation, if overland, was extremely inefficient, since it required the muscle power of enormous numbers of men or animals who themselves had to be fed. Consider a mule, capable of carrying a 200 lb. Ioad and needing 10 lb. of forage a day for its own maintenance.

To operate one day from its supply source, each mule would need 10 lb. of fodder for itself, leaving, on the average, 190 lb. of its load to supply the combat units. Thus a force of 30,000 men (each requiring 3 lb. of rations per day) and 5,000 horses (each requiring 15 lb. of fodder per day) would consume:
30,000 x 3 + 5,000 x 15 = 165,000 lb. (82.5 tons) during the one day expedition.

Since each mule can carry 190 lb. of this load the expedition will require:
165,000 lb. / 190 lb. per mule = 869 mules

This is a quite manageable number, but what if the expedition will be away from its source of supply for 10 days? The army then will need 825 tons (82.5 tons x 10 days). Worse yet, each mule now must carry 100 Ibs. (10#/day x 10 days) of fodder for itself. (If the train animals do not carry their own fodder, but obtain it locally, then the army is not relying on home supply, but in large part on local requisition of supplies, discussed below.) This leaves, on the average, only 100 lb. of its load to carry supplies for the rest of the army and 16,500 mules would be needed.

At 10 ft. per mule, that's a column of mules 2 abreast and over 15 miles long. It takes a full day for the supply train to march its own length. Furthermore half the mules are only carrying fodder for other mules and half of the supplies carefully gathered from a near sustenance economy are being used to feed train animals not combat units.

By the same reasoning it can be shown that a 19 day expedition by that same force will require 313,500 mules, forming a column 2 abreast and about 300 miles long! The rear of the supply train would not have left home before the front arrived back 19 days later! Clearly this is an impossibility.

Other transport systems might be more efficient, but only slightly so. Human porters could carry about 80 lb. each, while consuming 3 lb. per day, and horse or ox drawn wagons might carry 1,500 to 2,000 lb. per wagon while the four animals of the team consumed a total of 50 to 75 lb. per day.

However none of these could carry sufficient rations for itself, let alone for the army, for more than about 30 days; and on expeditions of over two weeks the necessary train would have a supply requirement equaling that of the combat force. Clearly this method is suitable only for the shortest expeditions .

Several solutions come to mind. One might use waterborne, rather than overland, transport. Ships and barges carry enormous loads with relatively small crews, so the fraction of the cargo capacity devoted to the crew's supplies is much smaller than in the examples of overland transport given above.

The disadvantage, of course, is that the army is limited to the vicinity of seacoasts, navigable rivers, and canals. Furthermore, a defeat of the fleet can cause the land force to withdraw. Such a naval reverse, at Salamis may, for example, be the reason that Xerxes was forced to withdraw the bulk of his land forces in the campaign of 480-479 B.C. Having lost his fleet he could no longer supply such a large army.[2]

Magazines

Another solution is to establish supply magazines throughout the theater, thus freeing the army from the need to carry all of its supplies for the campaign at all times. This is a very practicable solution, and although usually associated with eighteenth century warfare was used from ancient times [3] through the Napoleonic period [1] and beyond. A much smaller train can be used with this system, since the depots can be stocked gradually, with several loads, and since the army only needs sufficient train animals with it to carry supplies for a few days, until it reaches the next magazine.

Each magazine can be used to stock the next, thus a chain can be formed from the source of production to the army in the field. The placement of these magazines obviously required some forethought, since the stores in each had to be built up over days, or more often weeks, before they could be used. Also, since the stores in each magazine must ultimately have originated somewhere, the army is still limited by what it can produce at home and/or procure locally.

Thus the magazine system is a solution to the problem of transport, not that of production. Finally the magazines, particularly those near the enemy, required a garrison. Therefore this system creates some drain on the strength of the field army.

Most wargamers associate the magazine system with the slow, formal warfare of the eighteenth century. A well thought out system of magazines can allow great speed and flexibility, however. For example, the system of depots established by Wellington during the Peninsular War was used by his army, with few changes, for years. The army drew from one depot, then another, then back from the first again as its area of operations shifted.[1]

Also, surprisingly, this system allows for the fastest troop movements once the network has been established. A unit can march rapidly from one magazine to the next, assured of supply at the end of its march. It need not be encumbered by slow moving supply wagons, nor by the need to spend valuable hours of each day foraging rather than marchmg .

The alternative to home supply is to obtain supplies from local sources in the field of operations. Nineteenth century authors drew sharp distinction between purchasing supplies from local sources and taking those supplies without compensation. Although this distinction might be quite important to the peasant who just lost his harvest, the similarities between the two methods are greater than the differences.

First, and most importantly, any form of local procurement restricts the army to those resources which are available in the theater of war. This makes local procurement unsuited to particularly specialized or complex items (e.g. armor or ammunition), although occasionally arms and ammunition could be captured from enemy magazines or the raw materials necessary for such items obtained from local sources.[4] Also, the size of the army had to be proportional to the capa bilities of local agriculture.

For example, in the most celebrated example of local requisition, the practice of French Revolutionary armies in North Italy in 1796-1800, two special circumstances applied: the army involved was relatively small by the standards of later Napoleonic and many ancient armies, and the theater was populous and fertile. With larger armies or in less developed regions the army would quickly consume all the available food, and shortly thereafter both the army and the civilian population would begin to starve.

Keep Moving

Thus any army dependent on local supply for its food had to keep moving. The larger the army and the poorer the region, the less time it could stay in one area. Furthermore, once an army had passed through an area and consumed the supplies, no other army could obtain supplies there until the region had recovered, usually following the next harvest. If the foraging had been particularly thorough, however, so the seed grain had been eaten and the peasants had starved, local agriculture might not recover for years or even decades.

Also remember that in near-sustenance economies the amount of food available varies markedly with the season. Each harvest is barely sufficient to carry the population through to the next, and the worst shortages of food and fodder occur not in the winter, but in the early spring before the first crops have come up.

Preindustrial commanders had to delay the start of the campaign season not because the snows of winter or the mud of spring would hinder their army, so much as because the army would starve if it took to the field before there was corn on the ground to provide food and fodder.[5] Early spring campaigns are thus one type of operation in which the army using home supply and elaborate transportation systems should be at a distinct advantage.

Obtaining supplies locally sounds so simple most wargamers think it requires no planning. A few horsemen would stop at a farm and their horses graze at the roadside while the riders grab a chicken from the farmyard. What could be easier? While such an approach might suffice for a knight and his squire, it will hardly do for Murat with his cavalry reserve of 17,000 men and 17,000 horses. Not only will the fields and farms near the road soon be picked clean, leaving nothing for the rear of the column, but a horse can't survive on the grass chopped in half an hour. Either it must graze for much of the day, in which case it is neither marching nor fighting, or it must eat high quality, cultivated grain. Thus the troops either need to be spread over a wider area, or some local means of collection and distribution needs to be established.

Troops Pay

Three such solutions have been tried:

The simplest, used by many ancient armies, is to provide the troops with pay only, expecting each soldier to purchase food and clothing for himself and fodder for his mount. Such armies generally were followed by large caravans, virtual travelling cities, with food sellers, smiths, armorers, prostitutes and gamblers. This caravan would set up a bazaar at each resting place to provide for all the needs of the soldier.

At first glance this seems wondrously simple. The army commander needs only to transport a relatively small wagon train of gold and silver coins and all the armies needs will be taken care of! In fact, this system has little to recommend it. First, the system neither creates nor transports supplies, it simply passes the problems of requisition and transportation from the army commander to a civilian who faces all the same limitations discussed above.

Secondly, it actually worsens the supply problem, by adding an enormous number of camp-followers to the supply drain on the province. And finally, such civilian contractors will generally follow their own interest, not those of the army. They will stock high profit luxury items rather than spare helmets and javelins, and they will evaporate (or worse, change sides) at the first reverse.

Quartermasters

For these reasons the supply of the army was soon brought under military control. A small "quartermasters-general" corps was raised to purchase and distribute supplies locally. This could be a very efficient system. IF money was available in the army treasury, IF food and forage were available in the province, IF the local population wasn't overtly hostile, and IF no enemy force was near enough to interfere, then the small QMG corps; operating a few days ahead of the army could collect supplies into magazines at preplanned sites along the anticipated route of the army. The combat units, relatively unencumbered by baggage, would thus find food and fodder waiting for it along its route.

Theft

Instead of purchasing supplies, the army could resort to outright theft. Theft did not require the army to have any cash in its paychests, nor did it require the acquiesence of the local populace. In fact, this method could not be used in friendly territory because it would soon cause the population to turn hostile. Since these requisitioned supplies were generally collected by the troops and consumed on the spot, rather than being collected and distributed in a more orderly way by a trained comissariat[5], the army had to spread itself over a wider area to bring the men to the supplies. Obviously the army was more vulnerable to attack in such a position, with its divisions and corps spread over dozens of square miles, so this method was rarely practiced in close proximity to the enemy.

Also, the army not only had to disperse its grand-tactical units, but had to break down its battalions and regiments as well to form small foraging parties. Only an army with high morale, composed of patriotic, self-motivated soldiers could dissolve into such foraging parties and ever hope to reform for battle.[5]

Given these multiple solutions to the problems of logistics, how did pre-industrial armies actually operate, and what restrictions should be placed on the wargamer planning a pre-industrial campaign? Most commanders found that producing supplies at home and transporting them to the field army was a particularly favorable plan when dealing with lighter weight items, and those of such a highly technical and/or purely military nature as to be unobtainable from the local civilian population.

Armor, uniforms, weapons and the more complex types of ammunition would fall into the class. To represent this approach in the wargame campaign, each field force should be accompanied by a small supply train containing ammunition and replacement equipment. This train is initially stocked from armories in the home country, and can be restocked during the campaign from those same armories, from forward magazines previously stocked or possibly from captured, enemy magazines or trains.

This "combat supply" should not be obtainable by foraging or purchase from the local peasantry, will not be consumed while the army is only marching or standing idle; but for each major battle, every grand-tactical unit committed to combat will need to draw such supplies from the train. Should the unit engage in combat without "combat supply" its combat effectiveness will degrade.

Type of Army

The number of grand tactical units that can be supplied by a train of a given size, and the degree to which lack of supply effects a unit's combat effectiveness will depend very much on the type of army involved. Obviously an artillery battery will consume more tons of ammunition during a day's combat than a pike phalanx, and be more effected by a lack of ammunition as well.

Food and fodder must be handled rather differently, because of the enormous tonnages involved. Consider that in a three month horse and musket campaign an army might fight two major battles, and each infantryman shoot off 5 to 10 lb. of ammunition. Each man would have to be fed for every one of these 90 days, however, consuming about 270 lb. of food. For a cavalryman and his mount, with a much greater food requirement (almost 20 lb. per day for man and horse combined) and for whom combat supply would mean an occasional replacement for a damaged lance, sword or bridle, the ratio will be even more extreme. Thus, because of the enormous amounts involved food was obtained locally or transported by water in all but the shortest campaigns.

The wargamer also must choose how he will procure food and fodder. He may start the campaign with given, perhaps large amounts of grain in state graneries. As long as he is within two to three days march of such a source he will be able to easily meet his supply requirements, since the supply trains involved will be small and consume few supplies themselves. To operate 7 days march from the supply source (i.e. 7 days out and 7 days back) the necessary train will be so large as to equal the supply requirements of the combat units. It is impossible to operate 14 days march away (a one month round trip) from the source of supply, since the train will not be able to carry even its own supplies for that length of time. Obviously the use of this system will be limited to defensive actions, seiges, etc.

To range further afield, the wargame commander must eithera. construct a network of magazines out from his home country b. gather food locally and concentrate it in magazines or c. spread the army so it can gather food locally and consume it on the spot. If he chooses a or b the wise commander will establish at least two alternate axes of advance (and retreat), although he might not always stock the magazines along the secondary axis as well as those along the primary.

If b or c is employed, he must be certain the requirements of his army will not exceed the capacity of the province. Thus b and c may be impractical in thinly populated areas, in the early spring, and in areas previously depleted of supplies by heavy foraging and which have not yet had time to recover. Both strategies also would be difficult if an enemy field force were operating in the vicinity.

Lack of food will rapidly weaken an army, even in the absence of combat. Horses will suffer more under these conditions than men, in part because of their greater food requirements and in part because the horses cannot recover, as the men can, when supplies subsequently become available again.[5]

Thus losses due to lack of food should be particularly severe among the cavalry, artillery train, and supply train animals. Since the last of these are necessary to procure and distribute what remaining supplies are available, loss of supply train horses can further worsen the army's supply status in a vicious circle.

The astute reader will note that under this system wargame armies faced with similar problems will tend to seek similar solutions. In fact, in spite of differences in national temperament and military systems, all historical pre-industrial armies faced very similar limitations and their logistical systems were surprisingly similar.

Thus Wellington, a master at organizing magazines and supply trains, felt compelled to disperse his cavalry reserve and supply train animals (at no little risk) early in the Waterloo campaign, so these vast numbers of animals could forage locally, easing the drain on his supply system.[6] In contrast, such masters of improvisation and speed as Alexander the Great and Napoleon relied to a surprising extent on systems of magazines. This is probably the method Alexander used to cross the Gedrosian desert[3]; and Napoleon, although his army may have been somewhat less dependent on supplies and magazines than those of his opponents, still used an extensive series of magazines not only in the Russian campaign of 1812, but probably in all his Imperial (as opposed to Revolutionary) battles as well.

Napoleon at Work

Correspondance #12,689, for example, reveals this system at work.[7] In preparation for the Friedland Campaign (i.e. in May 1807) Napoleon instructs Daru to set up magazines, each containing so many thousands of rations at specific cities along the intended route of the army, and discusses which supplies should be purchased locally in Poland and which brought up from rear magazines.

Even the Hellenic commander who thinks he has avoided all logistical problems by paying his troops in cash and having them purchase supplies from the caravan has his strategic options limited by the fertility of the campaign area, the season of the year, and the inability of the caravanmaster's animals to carry any worhtwhile payload if they also must carry more than a few weeks food supplies for the caravan itself.

REFERENCES

1. Wellington's Headquarters. S.G.P. Ward. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford,1957.
2. The Year of Salamis 480-479 B.C. P. Green. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1970.
3. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. D.W Engels. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978.
4. The Persian Expedition. Xenophen. Penguin Books Limited, Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1949.
5. "Extract from a Memorandum on the War in Russia, 1812" by Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington, in The Duke. R. Adlington. Garden City Pub. Co., Garden City, New York, 1943.
6. Napoleon and Waterloo. A.F. Becke. Percy Lund, Humphreys & Co. Ltd., London, 1939.
7. "Correspondance #12,689. Napoleon to Daru, May 29, 1807 in La Correspondance de Napoleon Ier. Paris,1858-1870.

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