VARIOUS opinions have been expressed as to the motives which ruled Napoleon's decision to engage in the Russian war of 1812.

This war derived its origin from the war and peace of 1806 and 1807. When Napoleon quitted Tilsit, he withdrew deeply impressed with a conviction of the vast elementary warlike means possessed by Russia, capable of being cherished into formidable maturity even within a very few years from that epoch of discomfiture and, as it appeared to the world at large, of very long, if not irrecoverable exhaustion.

Napoleon had witnessed the unquailing valour of the Russian soldiery under circumstances the most unpropitious for its display, and had recognized qualities and properties which would render Russian armies, when duly organized, pre-eminent in some respects over all others. He had become acquainted with the no less resolute character of the Russia peasantry, and he had found nothing wanting which art might not supply for the construction of a military power on the most extensive, efficient, and economical basis. [The Russian soldier's pay was not more than twelve shillings per annum; rye-bread baked like biscuit, and water, his only ration in time of peace.]

He was aware that many defects and abuses existed in the internal administrative system of Russia to check the growth of her prosperity, and the development of her innate strength; but he saw that those defects and abuses were only temporary restraints on the vivifying energies of a people that composed a national phalanx of fifty millions of souls, disordered by no religious schisms, enfeebled by no provincial dissensions, but combined and consolidated by a common love of country, and devotional allegiance to the authority of one responsible ruler: "Imperator et Pontifex maximus." [The frequent deposition of the sovereigns of Russia by the nobility does not impair the passive obedience of the nation at large to the succeeding sovereign in possession.]

His inquiries into the statistics of Russia had instructed him that, although her inhabitants were distributed over so large a portion of the globe, still dense masses were collected in the provinces in which the principal establishments were situated; and his military information apprised him that, notwithstanding there were nearly eight hundred miles of accessible frontier [1000 wersts from Polangen on the Baltic, to Zeldcheki on the Dniester.] from the Baltic to the Dniester, a very few fortresses and tetes du ponts judiciously located, would render an invasion of her integral territory impractical.

Time and distance did not diminish the fears which grew out of these calculations of Russia's counteracting opposition to French dominion and ascendency in Europe; and the rejection by the Grand Duchess Anne of the marriage for which he had intimated his wish, 'in order that the alliance between the two empires might be better secured," added personal irritation to his political jealousies, and disposed him to watch with increased suspicion all the transactions of the Russian Minister.

Controversial discussions soon introduced asperity into the relations which had well established between the two sovereigns on the raft of the Niemen.

At Erfurth, indeed, Napoleon and Alexander met again in apparent amity, and there covenanted that each might pursue his war in Spain and Turkey, with a carte blansche as to their respective objects; but they separated without legal concord and confidence. [Alexander had required the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia; Napoleon, the dominion of Spain under his brother.]

Alexander's inability or reluctance to prejudice English commerce to the extent he had promised was the cause of new reclamations, and hastened the opportunity which Napoleon had for some time been restlessly coveting, to reduce that power and influence which, as he now found, he had himself essentially and prejudicially contributed to augment by advancing his position in Poland and authorising his acquisition of the island of Aland East, and a part of West Bothnia, as well as of Sweden and Finland; acquisitions not only important for the security of S. Petersburg, but which, by throwing Sweden permanently on a feeble defensive, relieved Russia from thc most embarrassing control over her views and operations against the Turkish empire.

It is true, there was always a propelling impulse to war, acting on and commanding the subjection of Napoleon to its instigations-an impulse not owing its incentives to his own temperament and habits, but distinctly to the very source and conservative principle of his throne. He felt, and all the world now acknowledges, that he could not reign in peace.

Peace was incompatible with his political existence. It was the destroyer of his power, gained by the sword, and which the sword only could maintain.

Under his chieftainship, the martial spirit of the French nation had been excited to the highest and wildest degree. France, always martially disposed, had become a military camp and community; her social as well as her civil system was framed upon a belligerent basis; war was the sole tie between the sovereign and the people; allegiance was demanded and rendered under no other tenure. There was no other shield against the hostility of the Bourbonists, the intrigues of Doctrinaires, and the insurrection of the Republicans, to whom peace would have given active and irresistible animation. There was no other check on the ever changeful, restless spirit of the French nation.

Still Napoleon, although thus unremittingly urged to be always seeking some new battle field, would not have selected Russia as an adversary, whilst the Spanish war was on his hands, but for the reasons and under the considerations stated.

Whilst these feelings and secret causes were bringing about a collision, current public transactions were the subjext of mutual incrimination. Napoleon complained "of the cold support given after the battle of Essling, of the increasing armanents of Russia, of the projected erection of fortresses on the Dvina and Beresina, and of new commercial restrictions which, although in strict accordance with the treaty, prejudiced French interests."

On the other hand, Russia complained, "that although, by the treaty of October, 1809, she had acquired some additional territory in Gallicia, the hopes of the kingdom of Poland were revived by a considerable aggrandizement of the duchy of Warsaw, which hopes Napoleon refused to extinguish by a declaration in the treaty 'that the throne of Poland should never be reestablished;" that Napoleon had incorporated into the French empire, to the prejudice of the balance of power, Holland, the Hanseatic Towns, and the duchy of Oldenburg; and that this last measure was an affront to the dignity and honour of Russia, as on the marriage of the Duke of Oldenburg with the Emperor Alexander's sister the integrity and independence of his state had been guaranteed." So incensed indeed was Alexander at this last act of indecorous as well as violent usurpation, that he made, and transmitted to all the courts of Europe, a formal protest against the seizure; nor would he listen to any terms of composition upon this point of grievance.

The reinforcement of the garrison of Dantzic to twenty thousand men, and the occupation of Hamburgh by the Corps of Davoust, under the pretext of counteracting the King of Sweden's connivance with the introduction of English goods and colonial produce, accelerated the rupture, and rendered it manifest to Europe that war was inevitable.

Napoleon by the magnitude of his preparations afforded indisputable proofs that he had not been explessing simulated fears of the Russian military power, but that he really did entertain the conviction that the contest in which he was about to engage was one which required for its success the federated aid of all the continental states in alliance with France; and before quitting Paris, he said to Count Lobau, when speaking of the Russian colossus that threatened to bestride Europe, "We must make three campaigns beyond the Vistula to secure our peaceful possession of the Seine;" using a coarse, but expressive illustration of his opinions as to the necessity and probable duration of the struggle.

Napoleon quitted S. Cloud on the 9th of May, and proceeded to Dresden, where he arrived on the 16th. He was met there by the Emperor and Empress of Austria, the Kings of Prussia and Saxony, and a great cortege of Archdukes and their consorts, German Princes, and others.

The most brilliant fetes followed his arrival, and all the crowned heads and assembled potentates strove to do him the most agreeable and obsequious homage as their Suzerain.

It has been said that Napoleon encouraged these adulatory ovations, flattering himself that such evidence of supremacy and subserviency would daunt the resolution of Alexander, dispose him to shrink from the combat, and abjectly yield to conditions that might be imposed to facilitate his own more remote views for the disseverment of the empire, by previous degradasion and consequent weakness.

Napoleon certainly was not ignorant of the dissatisfaction created in Russia by the humiliating scenes at Tilsit in the treaty 1807, and the angry feelings which Alexander's public deference to his pretensions to superiolity had engendered amongst his own subjects at that inglorious moment; the lesson had, in fact, been too impressive to permit Napoleon to entertain a reasonable hope that he could induce Alexander to fall again into the same snare. [The exasperated state of the Russians was such that Prince Czartorinsky and Count Nowesilsoff stated to Alexander the danger of the course he was pursuing, and after adverting to the secret article of war against England, they ventured to say "that this war would make him as unpopular as his father, and might lend to the same result." "I know it," replied the Emperor, without any cemotion; "I believe it to be my destiny; I cannot avert it; I am prepared, and submit."]

On the 25th of April Count Narbonne had been sent to Alexander by Napoleon, with the view of gaining time to carry out the military dispositions in progress. On the 27th of April Prince Kurakin, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, had given in his definitive note, with a declaration "that he must demand his passports if the conditions contained in the note were not forthwith admitted;" but he received no answer till Napoleon had quitted Paris for Dresden, and only then one couched in cold and evasive terms.

In the meantime, General Lauriston, who was the French Ambassador at S. Petersburg, had orders "to follow Alexander to Wilna, where he had gone on the 22nd of April, and whilst complaining of the tone and tenor of Prince Kurakin's last note, to keep open negotiations."

The Count de Narbonne, who had executed his previous instructions, had already seen Alexander, and reported, on his return upon the 28th of May to Napoleon at Dresden, "that he had found the Emperor inflexible without being arrogant."

Lauriston was not so successful in his mission, for he was prohibited from going to the Imperial headquarters, and had been referred to the Chancellor, Count Romanzow, for his solicited conference; but Count Narbonne's intelligence "that Alexander had refused to enter into any new negotiations before the French troops had evacuated Swedish Pomerania and the Prussian States, with the exception of the fortress of Dantzic, but which garrison should be reduced to its amount prior to the year 1811, "determined Napoleon to commence immediate hostilities; and quitting Dresden on the same day, he arrived at Thorn on the 6th of June, whence he dispatched an order for Lauriston" to ask for his passports, and demand that Freneh passports should be given to Prince Kurakin, who had been detained at Paris."

Some hours after Napoleon had left Dresden he received advice "of the King of Sweden's having, on the 24th of March, at Orerebio, entered into offensive and defensive engagements with Alexander;" and he was further disconcerted by the subsequent intelligence, "that under the influence of the British and Swedish envoys a treaty of peace between Turkey and Russia had been signed on the 28th of May."

Foreseeing, though too late, the relief which this peace would aid Russia, and to what a serious degree it might prejudice his operations against her; he immediately directed General Andreossi, who was waitigg at Laybach, in Croatia, for his definitive instructions, to proceed to Constantinople and effect a rupture, by a promise to the Sultan of recovering for him all the lately ceded territory, and even the Crimea." [Andreossi had arrived at Laybach on the 7th of June, and did not reach Constantinople until the 25th of July. He had been preceded by Mr. Liston the British Ambassador, and Major-genera1 Sir Robert Wilson; and the treaty of peace had been ratified on the 14th of that month.]

The confederated armies which passed the Niemen under Napoleon's own immediate orders was composed as follows, according to an official return stil1 extant in the French War Office, and which was framed from the returns sent in by the different commanders, without including the civil employes, servants, and traders who swarmed in every corps.

The whole military force of France, and of her vassal states also at the disposal of Napoleon, amounted at this period to 1,187,000 men:

French	850,000
Italian	50,000
Poles	60,000
Bavarian	40,000
Saxony	30,000
Westphalian	30,000
Wurtemberg	15,000
Baden	9,000
Rhine, Confederated	23,000
Prussian	20,000
Austrian	30,000
Neapolitan	30,000
Total	1,187,000

Of which aggregate Spain occupied 250,000.

From this estimate it was presumed that Napoleon could not only apply the force required in the first instance for the invasion of Russia, but that he could command a reserve adequate to its maintenance, according to calculations founded on the usual casualties of war; but to insure this object still more indisputably, he had ordered the establishment of a national guard in France, which included every one between the ages of 20 and 60 capable of bearing arms, and divided this array into three bands or classes.

A hundred thousand Poles, exclusive of the contingent of sixty thousand, also implored permission to raise the standard of independence, and garrison Poland as the advanced bastion and rampart of France against future Russian encroachment in Europe; and there is no doubt that if that wish had been gratified, even a larger force would have been ready to take the field.

Of this mighty mass of six hundred and fifty thousand men which Napoleon destined for the invasion and conquest of Russia, four hundred thousand effective soldiers (of whom one hundred and sixty thousand were native French) and sixty thousand cavalry entered simultaneously into active operations against Russia; but the want of nationality soon began to occasion the most serious evils, for the heterogeneous multitude were actuated by no regard for the honour of the country under whose banner in-chief they were ranked by the inhabitants, without any distinction of uniform or of language. Authority was weakened by the commingled service of troops regulated by no common system; discipline became relaxed; insubordination produced all its disorganizing consequences; confusion and want prevailed; pillage destroyed the resources-for there were no magazines provided and exasperated the peasantry, who were further infuriated by wanton and outrageous desecrations of theil churches and sanctuaries.

The Russian is a religious votary, but not an intolerant bigot. He insults no one for worshipping the God of all according to the practice of his forefathers, or the fashion of his own opinion. He lives on terms of perfect good fellowship with the dissentient from his creed; he arrogates to himself no immunities or advantages founded upon his own profession of faith; but the famished tiger raging for food is not more fierce and bloody in his wrath than a Russian at the sight of his polluted temples and violated altars.

The columns in march column were encumbered by an unusual quantity of baggage, an embarrassment which the ancients forcibly and truly designated "impedimenta belli" it seemed, indeed, as if the different corps were transporting all their movable property with intent to colonize the country there were about to enter, and that the safety of the "roulage" had been ensured by the very natives they proposed to dispossess of their lands and homes.

On the 12th of June, Napoleon arrived at Konigsburg. On the 19th of June he proceeded to Gumbinnen, reviewing on his route 160,000 men under Davoust, Oudinot, and Ney, and the divisions of cavalry under Nansouty and Montbrun. He then pushed forward and established his headquarters at Wolkowich, two marches from the Niemen, where Lauriston brought him advice "of the continued refusal of Alexander to negotiate until Count Narbonne had complied with the conditions already notified."

NAPOLEON'S PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY

Napoleon, highly incensed, announced the commencement of war with the following proclamation:

"SOLDIERS,

"The second Polish war is begun. The first terminated at Friedland, and at Tilsit. Russia vowed an eternal alliance with France, and war with the English.

"She now breaks her vows, and refuses to give any explanation of her strange conduct until French eagles have repassed the Rhine, and left our allies at her mercy.

"Russia is hurried away by a fatality: her destinies will be fulfilled. Does she think us degenerated? Are we no more the soldiers who fought at Austerlitz? She places us between dishonour and war - our choice cannot be difficult. Let us then marh forward; let us cross the Niemen and carry the war into her country.

"This second Polish war will be as glorious for the French arms as the first has been; but the peace we shall conclude shall carry with it its own guarantee, and will terminate the fatal influence which Russia for fifty years past has exercised in Europe."

The Emperor Alexander had not been a passive spectator of these preparations, whose note dad vibrated through the most distant regions of his empire, and of which the malshalled array now overshadowed his frontier from the Baltic to the Boug.

After the battle of Friedland, the whole Russian army which had fought that battle, and the preceding ones of Pultulsk, Eylau, and Heilsberg, had been reduced to a wreck of thirty-six thousand combatants; and thirty thousand additional troops of the line could not have been collected within three months to cover S. Petersburg and Warsaw.

Five years had scarecly elapsed since that epoch of distress and depression, and yet Alexander, notwithstanding all the demands on his finances to heal the wounds and repair the sacrifices made by the nation, had found means to awe Persia still fretting under her inglorious peace; to control the turbulent and incessantly insurrectionary Caucasus; to carry on a costly, and, in the last campaign, splendidly successful war against Turkey; to force Sweden to sign away at Fredelicksham the territorial possessions which she required for her protection against Russia, and for her own independence as a Continental Power; and, moreover, to occupy all the essential military stations of the empire: whilst, foreseeing the life-and-death struggle with France, he had been during the same time unremittingly organizing and collecting a defensive force between the Dnieper and the Niemen, which, on the declaration of hostilities, amounted to two hundred and fifty thousand infantry and cavalry, of which not above twenty-five thousand were irregular.

The whole regular force of the empire at this time amounted to five hundred and eighteen thousand men.

The creation of so large an effetive force, with an abundant material and magazines of every kind fully stored during a continuous state of warfare, without any grievous impositions upon the country or the raising of any improvident loans prejudicial to the general welfare, whilst it afforded incontrovertible proof of the immense resources of the empire, entitled Alexander to great credit as an administrator and executive guardian. But the same activity had not been shown in all the departments charged with the completion of a system of artificial defences that should have given much needed support to his armies, secured their lines of communication, and essentially delayed, if they had not altogether baffled, Napoleon's attempts to reach either capital.

Olders had indeed been given to augment the defences of Kiev on the lower Dnieper, and of Riga; to fortify Dunaburg, and to construct an entrenched camp at Drissa on the left of the Dvina, which might cover the high road from Wilna to S. Petersburg, and secure the retreat of the army in a retrograde movement, if one should be necessary. Directions were also given to construct a fortress at Bobruisk on the Beresina, and to form a tete du pont of considerable extent and strength at Borisow, also on the Beresina, and on the direct route from Minsk to Orsza; but when the war commenced the works at Dunaburg were little more than traced; those at Drissa were found not to be tenable; and the tete du pont of Borisow was only an imperfect field work, not closed in any part.

The Russian force destined to resist Napolcon was divided into three operating armies, with reserves distributed at the different points and stations which it was desirable to occupy.

The following was the classification and amount of the different Russian corps at the opening of the campaign of 1812. But it must be recollected that Russian battalions were not eight hundred strollg, that a squadron of cavalry did not exceed one hundred and fifty horsemen, and that a company of artillery consisted of only from a hundred and forty to a hundred and fifty men.

It should also be borne in mind, in order that there may not be an erroneous estimate of the relative strength of the combatants during the operations of the campaign, when corps and divisions are mentioned, that a Russian corps and division scarcely amounted to a moiety of the the enemy's, according to the original formation of the confederated army.

Exclusively of these armies, the Moldavian army that had been employed against the Turks, was composed of seventy-two battalions, eighty squadrons, seventeen companies of artillery, and fourteen regiments of Cossacks, that presented a total of above fifty thousand regulars.

This army was commanded by Admiral Tchichagow; but it is not yet the time to particularize the force with which he arrived on the Styr, to unite with the third army and assume the direction of both.

All the enemy's corps had not yet reached the Niemen, but Napoleon determined to effect the passage without further delay, and, dressing himself to appear like a Polish light horseman, proceeded with General Haxo to inspect the banks of the river.

The point having been selected at an angle formed by the river between Kowno and Ponemoni, General Eble was directed to throw three bridges across, distant from each other about three hundred yards; whilst General Morand, with three companies, crossed in boats to protect the construction. In eleven hours the bridges were ready, "the war javelin was hurled," and the French troops, on the 24th of June, commenced the invasion of Russia, in presence of a few Cossacks, whom the French cavalry repulsed and drove out of Kowno, where Napoleon the same evening established his headquarters, and ordered a bridge to be thrown over the Wilia.

Alexander, during the same night, whilst at a ball given by General Beningsen in his chateau of Zaerelt, a mile and a half from Wilna, received the intelligence of this passage, and on the next morning published the following address to his army, which was dispatched to S. Petersburg with the letter that announced to his subjects his resolve "not to sheathe the sword till the invaders were driven out of his empire."

It is clue to Alexander to put his address on record, for never did a sovereign more faithfully and fully maintain his engagements in the hour of adversity as well as of prosperity.

ALEXANDER'S PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY

"Wilna, the 25th of June, 1812

"We had long observed on the part of the Emperor of the French the most hostile proceedings towards Russia, but we had always hoped to avert them by conciliatory and pacific measures. At length, experiencing a continued renewal of direct and evident aggression, notwithstanding our earnest desire to maintain tranquillity, we were compelled to complete and assemble our armies. But even then we flattered ourselves that a reconciliation might be effected while we remained on the frontiers of our empire and without violating one principle of peace, were prepared to act in our defence: all these conciliatory and pacific measures could not preserve the tranquillity which we desired. The Emperor of the French, by suddenly attacking our army at Kowno, has been the first to declare war. As nothing, therefore, could inspire him with those friendly sentiments which possessed our bosoms, we have no choice but to oppose our forces to those of the enemy, invoking the aid of the Almighty, the witness and the defender of the truth.

It is unnecessary for me to recall to the minds of the generals, the officers, or the soldiers, their duty and their bravery. The blood of the valiant Sclavonians flows in their veins. Warriors! You defend your religion, your country, and your liberty! I am with you. God is against the aggressor."

This text comprises pages 1 through 24 of the book, but does not include the numerical tables detailing army organization and number of troops for both sides. The book continues to a total of 412 pages and includes maps, letters, and dispatches (some in French) in addition to the narrative of events from Napoleon's crossing of the Niemen River to the Russian capture of Warsaw in January 1813.

The French Invasion of Russia is available in the US via mail order from On Military Matters (click on the advertisement on the MagWeb home page for contact information). List price is $40 (plus $3.50 shipping and handling).

Magazine articles and contents are copyrighted property of the respective publication. All copyrights, trademarks, and other rights are held by the respective magazines, companies, and/or licensors, with all rights reserved. MagWeb, its contents, and HTML coding are © Copyright 1996 by Coalition Web, Inc.

This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com