Ben Wilkins' foreword in Battlefields Vol 1 Issue 2 has prompted me to provide a few thoughts of my own on the subject of unit formations on the battlefield and their relevance to wargames. The main point being how critical were the small scale formations i.e. the individual unit formation, to the outcome of a battle and as consequence how important are they to the rules used for playing a wargame.

GROUND SCALE

One fact which is often ignored or overlooked is that of ground scale. There is no point in trying to model anything where the ground scale and figure scale cannot resolve it. Within the are controlled by a block of wargames figures, say 75 yards by 25 yards, the local or unit formation within this boundary is irrelevant. This leads to the natural conclusion that the larger the ground scale the less relevance unit formations have. This may seem like stating the obvious but yet some rule sets try to model large scale (brigade and above) level games with mechanisms intrinsically no different to those used for a skirmish game-concern over the number of figures being able to shoot, being one such example.

Clearly local troop formations were relevant in real battles so how could they be built into model battles, if indeed they should. To answer this question it is perhaps best to start by looking at why various formations were developed in real armies.

FORMATION VERSUS TROOP QUALITY

It is probably true to say that local unit formations were used to achieve one or more of the following:

1. To maximise the units offensive or defensive capability (making the best use of the units compliment of weapons available and the ground upon which they intend to fight).
2. To enable effective manoeuver.
3. To steady troops.

It generally follows that a formation which is more easily manoeuvered usually has a penalty in offensive or defensive capability.

Dense formations are usually better to steady poorer quality troops (the herd instinct) and are often simpler to form, the French Column being one such example (see Keegan "The Face of Battle"). To illustrate this we need look no further than the often cited debate which took place at Edgehill. The question which caused apparent argument was whether to use a Dutch or Swedish formation for the pike and shot. The Swedish formation may have optimised the offensive and defensive capability of the weapons available but being more complex than the Dutch formation, was probably beyond the capability of the poorly trained English soldiers present at Edgehill. It may also have been less easy to manoeuver if an offensive action was intended. It would seem perfectly reasonable that any advantage lost by the troops ability to form, hold and manoeuver whilst in it and may have resulted in the troops loosing confidence and therefore becoming brittle and unsteady.

One could use the argument then that the better the troop quality the better formation they could use and thus the better was their offensive and defensive capability. If this assumption holds true, then we have in a roundabout way re-stated that, better quality troops fight better-fairly obvious really. It then becomes reasonable to say that- for larger scale games at any rate- it is reasonable to ignore many of the local formations and only take account of troop quality. This in many ways is what is achieved in the Wargames Research rules- De Bellus Multitudinis (DBM) where Inferior, Superior and Impetuous troops are used to modify a basic troop type.

These principles have resulted in a very basic set of troop types being used by my wargaming colleague and I when modelling the English Civil War battles. The rules used are a derivative of the DBM set (not, I might add, the new DBR set which I find too tedious). In these games we do not have a variety of pike and shot formations but a single element represents a number of pike and shot. If it is backed up by a second block it gives a close combat advantage; the rules giving an advantage to shot if they are spread out in a single line of elements greater frontage. The total number of different troop types being limited to Pike and Shot, Commanded Musketeers, (Forlorn Hope etc.) Dragoons. Cavalry troopers are either of the trotting firing or cantering charging types.

The preoccupation many rule sets have with fire factors formations and other minutiea often results in key elements being lost. Keeping the factors simple enables us to concentrate upon those factors which we have found win or loose battles those being command and control strategic use of troops deployment and perhaps the factor most often overlooked the terrain.

KEY FACTORS AFFECTING WARGAME BATTLES

Our study of English civil war battles and battlefields and our attempts to re-run those events on the wargames table, have resulted in almost every case with an outcome much as it was on the day of the battle. This has been accomplished not by "engineering" an outcome, but by doing what would seem reasonable in the particular circumstances. There have been a few notable exceptions where things did not go according to history. In these cases it was not because of unit formations but was to prove to be a consequence of not following the command structure or paying sufficient attention to the terrain of the battlefield.

A good example of this was the staging of the Battle of Nantwich. For anyone not familiar with this the battle the significant factors were: Sir Thomas Fairfax was advancing from the Northwest, in his attempt to relieve Nantwich which was being besieged by the Royalist Lord John Byron. To avoid a confrontation with an outlying Royalist strong point at Acton Church and to reach the town in the most expedient fashion he sent his column off the road and across "Enclosed land." The details of the troops available, their deployment and breakdown of the events of the battle are well documented. (J.Barratt "Nantwich 1644;" ECW Notes and Queries no. 49 and 50).

The initial re-fight was a complete disaster: Nothing happened as it ought to have done. In addition, and probably more importantly, we had to "force" certain actions which did not appear logical or consistent. We did not believe troop formations to be a key factor in its failure, so what was? The answer came from a different but not entirely unexpected direction.

The terrain we had modelled represented a series of small hedges, much the same as hedges would be today. After reading W.W. Hoskins book "The Making of the English Landscape," it became apparent that the "Enclosures" of the day were in fact very substantial boundaries, often in the form of a sunken road with a bank thrown up on either side, topped with fairly large trees and thick hedges. One of their main purposes was to provide a barrier to animals. Within the Enclosures the land was further subdivided into smaller fields we still see today in the Midlands, comprising of ditches and hedges.

Using exactly the same troop types and command structure, the game was replayed with a totally different result. What became obvious, was the difficulties such terrain has on command and control. This factor more than any other became the real issue. The ability to orchestrate an action, when it is "out of sight" even at a relatively small distance away, in disruptive terrain, becomes on order of magnitude more difficult. As does the scope for doing anything other than the simplest manoeuver. The PIP system of command and control used by the DBM rules, models this aspect sufficiently well yet in a very simple way such that the player does not get bogged down. It provides a very simple way of ensuring that the commander cannot do everything in some "godlike" way, without having to resort to their more complex methods such as written orders. This enables the player to concentrate on the real issues within the battle rather than the minutiae.

The terrain has other major effects; for instance whole columns of troops can be brought to a standstill by a small block of pike and shot occupying a gap in an enclosure. A block of commanded musketeers can hold back a significant body of horse (impossible on an open battlefield). A further illustration of these other effects was revealed during a demonstration game of the battle of Naseby, which was refought on the wargames table during the 1995 World Championships at Derby. On this occasion and in the practice game beforehand the importance of terrain, command and control were re-enforced. This was again an almost perfect re-run of the events of history, without the need to "engineer" an outcome. It also solved, for me at any rate, a few "mysteries." It certainly went some way to explain how with much smaller numbers of Cavalry, Rupert was able to make short work of the Parliamentarian left wing, with little more than superior morale and also why his absence from the battle later was so significant. The same was also true of the superior discipline of Cromwell's right wing of horse versus not ho highly motivated Royalist left.

The command structure and troop quality were on this occasion the most important reasons why the events unfolded in the way they did. Two examples of this were factors used in the game; by making Prince Rupert's cavalry slightly superior but impetuous and Cromwell having more command Points (PIPS) the subtlety of the cavalry battle was preserved without the complexity. The nature of the terrain also made the numerical superiority of the Parliamentarians less important and gave us insight into why it was to the King's advantage to attack. The shape and size of the chosen ground preventing the superior numbers of parliament being effectively deployed. It was also apparent that the dragoons deployed on the parliamentarian left wing behind a Parish Boundary hedge (enclosure?)were not so vulnerable as they might appear.

CONCLUSION

If I was asked to list the factors which have affected the outcome of our games with a ground scale of 1:300 or more they would be:

COMMAND AND CONTROL: Represented by the generals ability to control his forces. This one factor is catered for in the PIP system of DBM with slight modification for the commanders ability (+ or -PIPS). The impetuous nature of troops is a factor that can be easily modelled using the DBM principle or any other method which results in troops loosing order and cohesion e.g. Ruperts Cavalry always follow up as a single element (base of figures).

DEPLOYMENT: The appropriate number of troops being in the right place at the right time. the formation in this context is the larger scale formation of deployment e.g. Battle line.

TROOP TYPE: Maximising the use of troop type in any particular case is crucial, having the right troops in the right place e.g. Light troops in bad going or defending an obstacle.

TROOP QUALITY: The superior or inferior nature of a troop type-their ability to give and take punishment.

TERRAIN: Making the best use of the terrain and minimising it's negative effects. this should be modelled as accurately as possible to reflect the time and place. (We have developed a small hex system of tiles which enables battlefields to be modelled to a higher resolution than is normally used).

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