THE ATTACKERS

Massena had been obliged to leave garrisons in both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and a brigade of cavalry to maintain communications between the two fortresses. The armee de Portugal was therefore reduced to approximately 65,000 men when it arrived at the foot of the Serra de Busaco. This number included almost 7,500 cavalry which could not be used in any attacking capacity in such difficult terrain.

Similarly, the French artillery could not be dragged up the mountain in close support of the attacking divisions and from the foot of the serra they would not have been able to fire straight up the ridge 1,000 feet above them. Therefore, in attacking the mountain, Massena denied himself the use of two of his most effective weapons. But Massena had decided that Wellington's small army could not successfully hold such an extended position, and after a very brief reconnaissance from the lower slopes of the mountain he issued his orders for the attack.

As well as leaving his cavalry and artillery in reserve Massena also kept one of his infantry corps in the valley below in case of a reverse. The attack was therefore to be delivered by the IInd Corps and the VI Corps only. The strength of the two corps was as follows:

"II Corps will attack the enemy's right," wrote Massena on the evening of 26 September, "it will endeavour to break through the enemy's line, after scaling the most accessible point of the mountain. It will reach its objective in one or two columns preceded by skirmishers. Once it has reached the crest at the point selected for attack, it will form up in close column and cross the mountain ridge to the Coimbra road and beyond. It will halt at the Busaco monastery.

VI Corps will attack by the two tracks leading to the Coimbra road; one of its divisions will be held in reserve "...Marshal Ney will dispose his two assault columns so as to launch them as soon as General Reynier has captured the ridge, and he will then advance on the Busaco monastery. It will be Marshal Ney's duty to press home his attack if he sees the enemy either trying to counter General Reynier or retiring. . . "

There was to be no general advance along the line. The attacks of Ney and Reynier were not to be simultaneous and they would be separated from each other by a distance of over two miles. Thus the attacks would not be mutually supporting unless Reynier succeeded with the initial assault. But, by the same token, the attacks were so far apart that any defenders drawn to one attack could not be withdrawn to help repel the other attack. Massena expected that by throwing a mass of 14,000 or 15,000 men in close order at each of two narrow fronts he would be able to pierce the thin allied line.

Thus Wellington had decided to defend Busaco because he considered the heights unassailable. Massena had chosen to attack Busaco because he believed the ridge was so extended it was indefensible.

French Order of Battle

II CORP (Reynier)

VI CORPS (Reynier)

Historical Background
The Battlefield
The Defenders (and OOB)
The Battle

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