This article is based on a paper presented to the 1995 Consortium on Revolutionary Europe and lecture presented to the Spring 1995 meeting of the Napoleonic Association.

In a life and legend unmatched in history, the "One Hundred days" of Napoleon's return to power in 1815 stands out as the ultimate to gain, or regain, glory. Seen by some as nothing more than a giant ego trip, and by others as a last try to restore the values of the French Revolution, the Hundred Days was a throw of the dice with the judgement of history at stake. Napoleon himself recognised this. On the Inconstant he exclaimed to those around him that 'the die is now cast'. 1

At right, 19th century porcelain of Marshal Marmont, whose defection with VI Corp doomed Napoleon's last stand in 1814.

In the campaign of 1813-1814, Napoleon failed to either defeat his enemies or accept early peace offerings that would have saved his throne. Instead, he placed his hopes in a desperate defence of Paris, hoping to sandwich the Allies between Paris's defenders and his own forces. If there was any hope of a military victory for Napoleon, it was dashed with the defection of Marshal Marmont's Sixth Corps and the unwillingness of the Marshals to continue to rally the troops, and the political efforts made by Tallyrand and the Provisional Government.

Napoleon abdicated unconditionally on April 11, 1814, with the words "there is no sacrifice, not even that of life, which he is not ready to make for the interests of France.". 2

Napoleon's loss of the support of the French people is summed up by his secretary, Fleury de Chaboulan, who wrote: 'As long as good fortune waited upon Napoleon, his most ambitious attempts commanded the applause of the nation. We boasted of his profound political wisdom, we extolled his genius, we worshipped his courage. When his fortune changed, then his political wisdom was called treachery, his genius, ambition, and his courage, fool-hardiness and infatuation.' 3

Treaty Terms

The terms of the treaty that resulted from Napoleon's abdication included a provision for Napoleon and his family to keep their titles and a pension of two million francs. Napoleon was given the island of Elba '..in full sovereignty and property' with a guard of 400 soldiers. 4 The treaty did not require him to remain on Elba, nor did it forbid him to return to France.

At left, the official medallion (left) of the Congress of Vienna, box medals (center) contain the entire text of the Constitutional Charter, which Louis XVIII hoped would reassure French citizens, and a rare snuff box (right) celebrating the passing of the Constitutional Charter--but showing that Napoleon was a force behind it. David Markham Collection

Napoleon's departure from Fontainebleu was emotional, and he made the most of this opportunity. He praised the valour and loyalty of his men. He declared his willingness to sacrifice his future to avoid a civil war. 'You are my children. I cannot embrace each one of you, but I embrace you in the person of your general.' He then embraced General Petit. 'Bring me the eagles which have led us through so many perils and on so many glorious days.' He covered his face with one of the battle flags, and a long moment of silence ensued. 'Farewell, my old companions! My good wishes will always be with you! Keep me in your memories!'

Napoleon spent much of his time on Elba in a serious effort to improve conditions there. He was bitterly disappointed that Marie-Louise and his son had not been allowed to join him, but other members of his family dropped in from time to time. Political leaders and other important people would visit him, and he would discuss politics with them at great length. Napoleon was especially cordial to British visitors, and went out of his way to see that the British representative, Colonel Campbell, felt welcome in his court. 5

All the while, Napoleon kept an eye on the Congress of Vienna's attempt to divide up Europe to everyone's satisfaction. He began to hear rumours of assassination attempts, or of attempts to move him to St Helena. Louis XVIII never paid him his pension, and there was some fear of running out of money. In December 1814, Louis confiscated all the Bonaparte personal possessions in France. This situation concerned the other Allies, who were fearful that it would only give Napoleon an opportunity to claim that the Treaty of Fontainebleu had been broken.

Napoleon soon began to believe that the people of France were anxious for his return. With Louis XVIII had come hordes of noble emigres, all of whom were eager to return France to its pre-Revolutionary condition. The new King tried to reassure the people that there would be no such return by passing a constitutional charter, but the actions of the aristocracy around the throne told a different story. Moreover, some units of the Grande Armee were disbanded, but the soldiers did not assimilate well, back into society. France's economy had little room for them, and they were disgruntled at the loss of glory their defeat had brought.

Things evidently came to head when, on 15 February 1815, Napoleon was visited by Fleury de Chaboulon. He relayed the opinion of Hugh Maret, Napoleon's former Foreign Minister, that the people were '..clamouring for Napoleon's return.' 6 This visit may have been just what it took to convince Napoleon that conditions were right. He himself had forecast the likelihood of, and the reason for, his return. On St Helena he told Las Casas that he had anticipated this upon his departure from Fontainebleu. He explained, 'If the Bourbons, said I, intend to commence a fifth dynasty, I have nothing more to do here; I have acted my part. But if they should obstinately attempt to recontinue the third, I shall soon appear again..." 7

Only his closest associates were told of his plans. Bertrand was pleased with the opportunity to return to France. Drouot, on the other hand, took the entirely sensible point of view that challenging the military might of France and of the Allies with some 1100 troops involved a certain amount of risk! 8 Napoleon's mother gave him encouragement with the words 'Go my son, go and fulfil your destiny . . . I see with sorrow that you cannot remain here." 9

On Sunday, 25 February 1815, Napoleon set sail for France on the Inconstant accompanied by the Saint Esprit and the Caroline. Together, these ships carried some 1100 men, 40 horses and four cannon. While travelling to France, Napoleon accurately predicted that he would meet no organised resistance and that he would reach Paris without firing a single shot.

Napoleon's Bulletin to France

In a bulletin to his soldiers still in France, Napoleon was at his most eloquent: 'Soldiers! In my exile I heard your voice . . . Your general, called to the throne by the voice of the people and aided on your shields, is restored to you; come and join him . . . We must forget that we have been masters of other nations, but we must not suffer any to interfere in our affairs . . . Victory will march forward at the charge step: the eagle, with the national colours, will fly from steeple to steeple till it reaches the towers of Notre Dame! 10

A similar bulletin, 'To the French People' reminded them that they had been defeated due to the defection of Marshal Augereau in Lyons and Marshal Marmont in Paris, thus snatching defeat from a sure victory!' 11 Finally, he prepared a bulletin for the soldiers he was most likely to face upon landing and marching towards Paris, which read in part 'Soldiers, the drum beats the general, and we march: run to arms, command join us, join your emperor, and our eagles! 12

At left, commemorative medallion, "The Eagle Flies to France." The David Markham Collection.

Napoleon had three audiences in these messages. He could not have succeeded if he had encountered any real military resistance. Therefore, he appealed to the army to join him in overthrowing the treachery of others and restoring their glory. He pulled out all the stops, with references to the treachery, the glory of his soldiers, and his 'willingness' in responding to their 'calls' that he return.

The second audience was the French people. He understood that the people would not be interested in new military adventures. They had had enough conquest and empire. With any luck, they might be willing to support him in a new role of constitutional emperor. Thus, his appeals to glory and calls for revenge were tempered with a recognition that times had changed, and control over nations was no longer on the agenda.

This latter point was especially important for his third audience, which was the Congress of Vienna. While it is true that Napoleon misjudged their readiness to rally against him, he certainly understood that they would at least need some sort of reassurance that he would no longer engage in imperial conquests. Thus these bulletins deliberately stressed his domestic goals and specifically renounced a return to the earlier empire. We must not forget that we have been the masters of other nations.

Napoleon's March to Paris (Part 2)

NOTES

1 Alison, Sir Archibald, bart, History of Europe from the Commencement of the French Revoduton in MDCCCXV to the Restoration of the Bourbons in MDCCXV 10 vol (Edinburgh and London 1843) X, 304.
2 Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, Correspondance de Napoleon 1er (Paris 1869) 27, No 21558 Transition found in Fain, Baron John, The Manuscnpt of 1814 A History of Events that followed ed to the Abdicaton of Napoleon, Written at the Command of the Emperor (London 1823) 250-251.
3 Fleury de Chaboulon, Pierre Alexandre Douard, baron, Memoirs of the Private Life, Return and Reign of Napoleon in 1815, 2 vol (London 1820) I: 3-4.
4 For a full translation of the treaty, see Fain, 271-282
5 This was not purely for social reasons, as Napoleon felt the need to keep a strong and ready link to the Allies, should there be a threat to his personal safety. For a good dscussion on this, see Henry Houssaye, The Return of Napoleon, (London, 1934) 11-13.
6 Cronin, 385-386.
7 Las Cases, Marie Joseph Emmanuel Auguste Dieudonne, comte de, Memorial De Sainte Helene Journal of the Private Life and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon at Saint Helena, 4 vols (Boston, 1823), Part Three, 30-31.
8Thiers, Adolphe, History of the Consulate and the Emperor of France under Napoleon. Translated by D Forbes Campbell and H W Herbert, 5 vols (Philadelphia, 1893) 5: 423-424.
9Ibid. 423
10 Correspondance, 28, no 21682. For a complete translation, see Fleury 173-180
11 Corespondance, 28, no 21681. Translation found in Fleury: 177-180
12 Corespondance, 28, no 21683. Translation in Fleury, 181-182