By A.F. Becke.
Reprinted by Greenhill Books.
Price: 19.95 pounds

Becke's work is regarded as one of the great classics produced on Waterloo by British Napoleonic historians. However, this should not be taken as a recommendation, but rather as a warning. This book contains all the faults characteristic of that particular school of scholarship. The main idiosyncrasies of that body of writers are admiration for Napoleon, excuse-making for Wellington and the continuous repetition of certain myths long after they have been shown to be falsehoods. There are examples of all these in Becke's work.

It should not be forgotten that this reprint is of the condensed version of Becke's earlier work that was produced for popular consumption just before the Second World War. The original, two volume version, was published in 1914. The dates of publication are themselves an indication of the content of the work. These are times in historical writing when emotions play a greater role than an objective search for the facts. On reading Becke, it becomes clear that he is one of those 'my country right or wrong' historians. Amongst the detailed information which forms a substantial part of this work, there is also a good deal of misinformation, supposition, conjecture and myth presented as fact. It is difficult for the unversed reader to distinguish between the two. The original version at least had footnotes and references which made an analysis of the value of this work possible. The condensed version does not.

Myths of Time

Let us now look at some of the myths that Becke repeats. Firstly, to the question of whether the Duke of Wellington heard on 14th June from the Prussians of the French concentration and the impending offensive and on 15th June of its commencement. Becke states: '. . . his first intimation of Napoleon's attack on the I Prussian Corps was received between 3 and 5 p. m. from the Prince of Orange in person'. 1

This myth crops up time and again throughout British historical writings on the subject, another example, one of many, being in Lady Longford's Wellington, the Years of the Sword. 2 This particular legend is that the Prussians in general and, here, Zieten in particular, failed to inform Wellington of their intelligence and intentions which is why Wellington failed to take appropriate action to counter the French offensive on 15th June. The great national hero, the Duke of Wellington, was, of course, entirely blameless, whilst it was these devious and incompetent foreigners, in this case particularly Germans, who were at fault.

One of the few British works that has not used that myth was Siborne's. An objective analysis of the facts and an examination of archive material demonstrate that Wellington first knew of the commencement of the French offensive at 9 am on 15th June, 3 and continued to receive reports throughout that day before finally reacting to a message from Blucher which he received at 3 pm. 4 Rather than admit that Wellington was a little tardy in dealing with the situation, writers like Becke have found it a lot easier to lay the blame for his mistake elsewhere. How could it be the great national hero? Of course it was really the Germans.

A further example is the question of whether Dornberg sent intelligence of French movements to Wellington on 15th June. This is what Becke says on the subject:

'For timely information about Napoleon's movements the Duke had relied on Colonel Colquhoun Grant Colonel Grant himself never acted as a spy but invariably wore uniform. Grant himself was also in advance of the allied outpost line. To ensure a rapid transmission of Grant's reports the Duke appointed General von Dornberg to act as an intermediary. On the 15th, Grant's agent reported that "the roads were encumbered with men and vehicles and that officers of all ranks spoke freely of a great battle being fought within three days."

This information Grant immediately sent back for transmission to the Duke. General von Dornberg, however, arrogated to himself the right to select those messages which he considered worth sending to the Duke; and the General returned the message to Grant with the remark that, far from convincing him that the Emperor was advancing to give battle, it assured him the contrary was the case. Grant instantly arranged to send the message straight to the Duke, but it was impossible to get it through in time and it only reached Wellington at 11 am on 18th at Waterloo, too late to be of the slightest service. Dornberg's presumptuous folly was responsible for keeping Wellington in the dark during the 15th and 16th. Had this news come to hand in time, Napoleon's plan would have been far clearer to Wellington and it would have prevented some of the delay which occurred on 15th and early 16th, ....' 5

Good "Boy's Own" stuff, is it not? We have our noble English hero, braving death by riding around behind enemy lines in uniform (he would, of course, not be so underhanded as to act as a spy), his valiant efforts foiled by the arrogance and incompetence of a German. What, however, are the documented facts? Let us refer to vol 10 of Wellington's "Supplementary Despatches". This contains the following messages from Dornberg to Wellington's Headquarters:

1. 9th June: Buonaparte reported in Maubeuge, spies active in France, Dutch outposts reconnoitred by French.
2. 9th June: New French formations in Valenciennes, heard from Zieten, 30,000 French coming from Paris, Buonaparte reported in Maubeuge.
3. 10th June: Confirmation that Buonaparte is in Maubeuge. Large forces and magazines reported there.
4. 10th June: 80,000 men on their way from Paris.
5. 11th June: French concentration at Valenciennes and Maubeuge continuing.
6. 12th June: Intelligence from French deserters.
7. 12th June: 100,000 French troops on their way.
8. 13th June: French moving to Maubeuge by Beaumont.
9. 14th June: French movement to Pont sur Sambre reported.
10. 14th June: French troops reported shouting 'Vive l'Empereur'.
11. 15th June: Prussians attacked. (Message timed at 9.30 am).