The following article hopes to do more than provide an outline of the military involvement of these two prince-bishoprics in the Seven Years War. It begins with a discussion or the political context which shaped not only the decisions commiting both territories to contributing troops to the Austrian army, but also provides the background for the participation of other German territories in the conflict. In doing so, I hope to indicate the wider political factors that accounted for the poor military performance of the Imperial Army (Reichsarmee) as much as its its better known battlefield defeat at Rossbach, in 1757.

Larger version of map at right: warning: big file--slow download.

The prince-bishopric of Wurzburg was one of the most important third-ranking territories within the Holy Roman Empire. With a total area of 4,950 square kilometers and inhabited by nearly 950,000 people in the mid 15th Century, it was the largest of the 29 principalities, counties and imperial free cities in the Franconian Circle. [1]

During the second half of the 17th Ccnlllry, it had assumed the national political importance when its bishops had been at the forefront of those princes intent on preserving the Empire as a functioning political hierarchy, led by the emperor, without, at the same time, unduly strengthening the power of the Habsburg Dynasty, which traditionally exercised the imperial office.

It was easiest to steer this course when Habsburg and wider princely-territorial interests coincided as during the great wars against France and the Turks in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Then, Wurzburg had been a major supplier of auxiliaries for the imperial forces, usually in return for money to cover military expenses and minor political concessions to enhance the bishop's autonomy from the Wurzburg cathedral chapter.

The canons of this august and aristocratic body, like those in the other ecclesiastical states within the Empire, traditionally elected each new bishop, monopolized most of the key governmental functions, controlled much of the territory's fiscal structure and acted as self-appointed guardians of its traditional privileges and "liberties." The three Habsburgs who held the imperial title between 1658 and 1740 (Leopold I, Joseph I and Charles VI) had been relatively skillful at exploiting such domestic disputes to maintain a balance between the multitude of territorial rulers and their local institutions.

However, a manipulation of this balance had hecome increasingly difficult after 1740 (if not before) due to the divergence of Habshurg dynastic interests from the concerns of the smaller territories. In their determination to recover Silesia, lost to Prussia in 1740, the Habsburgs became less particular about the sensibilities of the weaker princes. The parallel expansion of Austrian and Prussian power and resources after 1740 further reduced the relative weight of the other rulers within the Empire.

These developments helped reduce Wurzburg's status to that of a regional power by the mid 18th century. In addition to its still significant military potential [2] , its political inf1uence rested on its not infrequent connection with the neighhoring prince-bishopric of Bamberg, a tcrritory of 3,575 square kilometers and 180,000 people, immedialely to the east. Subject to imperial and papal approval, it was possible for an individual to rule more than one bishopric simultaneously and despite their mutual suspicions, the cathedral chapters of Wurzburg and Bamberg appreciated the political advantages of both the major Franconian ecclesiastical territories being ruled by the same man.

Though Bamberg had never been a military power of any note, whoever became bishop automatically acquired the key position of Kreis (Circle) Executive Prince. Each of the still-functioning Circles (regional subdivisions) of the Empire had (normally two) such princes who acted as the conduit for all official correspondence with the emperor and the Reiechstag (imperial diet), and served as coordinators for all common political and military action at the Circle level. While outright defiance of imperial commands was difficult, an Executive Prince could, nonetheless, use his powers to render cooperation of the other member territories difficult by, for example, failing to issue the necessary mobilization orders and an almost endless range of other delaying tactics.

Wurzburg and Bamberg in the Politics of the SYW

Wurzburg had been ruled by Bishop Adam Friedrich Count Seinsheim. a well-connected German aristocrat, since January 1755. In one of his first acts, Seinsheim negotiated a subsidy treaty with Hanover on September 6, 1755, agreeing to hold three battalions, each of 800 men, in readiness. in exchange for 60,000 florins a year. There was the promise of additional money if the units actually had to march to Hanover's defense. [3]

At the time of its signing, this was not a controversial arrangement for it even won the formal consent of Austria. Britain and Hanover were still the emperor's allies, while Wurzburg had previously provided auxiliaries for another of Austria's northern allies, the Dutch Republic, in 1747-48. The neighboring Franconian Margravate of Ansbach also signed a treaty with Hanover at roughly the same time.

The reversal of alliances threw these calculations as Britain sided with Prussia while France joined Austria in a novel anti-Prussian coalilion. Like many other principalities, Wurzburg was now caught in the middle of this new political configuration. Most of the lesser territories had no desire to support a war. The main purpose of which appeared to be thc reconquest of Silesia and the aggrandizement of Habsburg power. However, with France now the ally of Austria, the traditional counterweight to the emperor's influence within the Empire was now removed.

Open alliance with Prussia was hardly an attractive proposition, especially for Catholic states like Wurzburg and Bamberg. Prussia, like Hanover, had long been (rightly) suspected of harbouring designs to secularize and annex those ecclesiastical tcrritories that had survived the Reformation. Frederick the Great's invasion ol Saxony in August 1756 was a clear violation of the imperial constitution and only served to heighten such fears. In these circumstances, most territories advocated collective mediation through the Reichstag to defuse the crisis and resolve Austro-Prussian antagonism. Understandably, the emperor refused to tolerate this and used his formal powers and still substantial influence to force the territories to support an official imperial war to punish Prussia.

In early August of 1756, Kaunitz., the Austrian chief minisler, warned Seinsheim not to negotiate an extension of the Hanoverian treaty. Like many of his fellow rulers. Seinsheim was faced with a stark choice: either limit his involvement in the. conflict to providing his obligatory contingent to the imperial army, or he could try and extract political advantage by enthusiastically backing the war effort.

His pro-Austrian connections and common Catholic faith inclined the bishop to take the latter course, leading to a new military alliance with Austria on September 16, 1756. This required Wurzburg to provide two infantry regiments to Austria for two years. One was to march immediately at the bishop's expense, while the other could follow within three months in return for a refund of forty florins per man to cover the mobilization costs. A further convention of October 27th specified the strength of each regiment at 1,864 men and 4 cannon.[4]

The policy brought swift political rewards. On March 6, 1757 the 78-year-old Bishop Stadion of Bamberg died, leaving the post of Franconian Executive Prince vacant. It was vital to Austria that a loyal incumbant could be found quickly so that the mobilization of the Franconian contingent would not be disrupted. Imperial influence was brought to bear and Seinsheim was duly elected on May 23rd. This represented a considerable achievement for Kaunitz, coinciding as it did with the defection of Ansbach, the other Franconian Executive Prince, from its former alliance with Hanover.[5] The Franconians mobilized their full contingent and together with the Swabians, were the most active in supporting the imperial war effort.

However, the political repercussions of the Seinsheim decision were not all positive. Following the Prussian occupation of Saxony and part of the Saxon duchies in 1756, Franconia was within the operational radius of Frederick the Great's armies. As the main collection point for the imperial army, Franconia was a logical target for Prussian attack.

In May 1757, Frederick sent 1,800 light troops to disrupt the imperial forces assembling between Bamberg and Nuremburg This was followed by deeper and more substantial raids in 1758, May 1759, and November 1762 that were designed to exploit the growing disenchantment of the lesser princes with the imperial policy and to intimidate them into withdrawing from the war.

Though the Prussians were never in a position to hold the territory, they raided, they added weight to their arguments by levying "contributions," a type of military extortion racket whereby communities were compelled to pay large sums to avoid having their properties burnt or plundered. As the most northeasterly territory, Bamberg was affected by all four raids. Twice the Prussians levied contribulions of over 500,000 florins each, equivalent to well over one year's state revenue from taxation.

Leading citizens, including Bamberg's suffragan bishop, were dragged off to Prussia as hostages against payment once the raiding parties had retreated. To raise thc necessary sums, the Bamberg chapter had to sell the bishopric's landed estates in Carinthia to the Habsburgs, a move fraught with commercial and political implications which soured Austro-Bamberg relations for decades to come.

Situated further to the west, Wurzburg escaped the worst of the raids, but suffered nonetheless. Straddling the Main River valley, the bishopric lay across the route of any troops moving north to assist the French in Hesse or the Austrians in Bohemia and Saxony. Though localities were supposed to be reimbursed for accomodation, food, and transport that they provided. Some soldiers were none too particular about observing these formalities. Large numbers of Austrian and allied troops, including the disorderly Wurttemburgers, lodged in Wurzburg during the winter of 1759-60 at great expense.

Clearly, whatever the personal political advantages it brought the bishop, the war proved costly for his two territories.. However, as other rulers also discovered, it was very difficult to reverse this course one a territory had become committed to the imperial war effort and its auxilliary forces had joined the Austrian and coalition forces. Seinsheim, therefore, remained in the Austrian camp to the very end, extending his military convention and requiring his lands to provide several thousand additional recruits to replace the casualties and deserters.

The Wurzburg and Bamberg Armed Forces in the Mid 18th Century

Despite being an ecclesiastical territory with an elected ruler, the structure of the Wurzhurg armed forces did not differ from those of other medium-sized secular territories. The bishop had supreme executive control over the army in both Wurzburg and Bamberg. Both principalities maintained their own destinct Kriegsralt (Court War Council), presided over by a member of the cathedral chapter, as the chief decision-making forum for all matters of military administration and justice. In addition, in keeping with its larger military establishment, Wurzburg had a separate General Staff consisting of a handful of generals and about a dozen adjutants and commissariat officials. Unlike a modern general staff, this body had little to do with long-term strategic planning, resource mobilization, or war management, but concerned itself primarily with narrow matters of military administration and discipline.

Like most small territories, Wurzburg witnessed an upgrading of its senior military ranks during the 18th century, so that by the 1750's many of its regiments were commanded by officers with general's rather than colonel's rank, despite the fact that they had rarely commanded more than a few hundred men at a time. These illustrious personages presided over a force of about 3,800 men in peace time (see Appendix A), while neighboring Bamberg made do with a single colonel, Karl Dietrich von Aufsess, as commander of all its forces and fortresses.

The Wurzburg forces were subdivided into a range of units that was typical for the smaller and medium German slates. Nominally the most prestigious formation was the Leibgarde zu Pferde, created in 1699 to add luster to the episcopal court. This unit had served in the field as part of the territory's cavalry contingent with the Franconian forces in 1733-35, but remained at home during the Seven Years War. [6]

A second mounted unit, the Husaren Feldgarde, had been established in 1723 in the fashion of other territories as a type of gendarmerie to patrol the highways and round up beggars and other "social undesirables". They, like Wurzburg's primary cavalry unit, the Dragoon Regiment, also remained behind in 1757.

Raised in 1688, the Dragoons had once been part of the auxilliaries which had served in the earlier wars against France. Since 1714, part of the regiment had been designated as the cavalry contingent to the Franconian corps and had been maintained in a reasonable state of readiness; until the early 1750s. Since then it had been completely dismounted and had to be remobilized in 1757 to take the field in four companies. The rcst of the Dragoons remained in Wurzburg, serving only to escourt new recruits to the front.

Three single-battalion infantry regiments, all with their origins in the earlier auxiliary formations. formed the backbone of the army. When Franconia mobilized at the end of 1758, nine companies were detached to serve as the infantry contingent. Beforehand, the best men had been drawn out and transferred to the auxilliaries intended for Austria, necessitating the drafting of 750 militiamen to bring them up to war strength.

The remnants of the three original regiments then disappeared into the two auxilliary units. The first, named Rot-Wurzburg after its red facings, had to be provided immediately under Seinsheim's treaty obligations.

Accordingly, the pre-war regiments Hutten and Drachsdorf became the first and second battalions respectively and were brought up to strength with 400 men from the third regiment, Kolb. This left only the remaining 505 men of the Kolb Regiment as cadre for the second auxiliary regiment, Blau Wurzburg.

The first battalion was formed with these men and raw recruits while the second battalion had to be raised entirely from scratch. The departure of the two regiments in March and May 1757, respectively, left Wurzburg without any infantry. In keeping with past practice, the Land Regiment, or militia, was called out for guard and garrison duty. This formation had a nominal strength of 6,000 men in 15 companies, but only a few companies were ever called out at a time. In 1758 the mobilized portion of the militia was put on the same footing as one of the auxiliary regiments (i.e. 1,864 men). Apart from a dispatch of a few gunners, the remaining units, the Artillerie Korps and the Konigshofen garrison company, remained behind. (see Appendix B).

In contrast to Wurzburg, Bamberg's regular forces were much smaller, probably numbering less than 1,000 men in 1756. The bulk of these were grouped into a single infantry regiment formed in 1734 by amalgamating existing units. This regiment was broken up to provide the Bamberg infantry contingent to the Franconian corps. The other main formation, the Leibgarde, had once been a respectible cavalry squadron. but was dismounted in an economy measure by 1756. It was reactivated as two companies of Franconian cavalry, leaving behind just the remnants of the infantry, two artillery companies and a militia of 1,200 men divided into six companies. After 1763, both territories reconstituted their pre-war formations which then remained essentially unchanged until their integration into the Bavarian army in 1802.

Bernard Sicken's detailed analysis of the surviving muster lists which date from 1789 indicate that, while the generals and most of the company commanders were nobles, up to two thirds of the other officers were commoners. Comparison with data from the armies of other ecclesiastical states indicates that this was relatively common and unlikely to have differed substantially from the social composition thirty years earlier. Equally, the rank and file came overwhelmingly from within Wurzburg and the surrounding Franconian slates, a factor influenced by the practice of drafting militiamen into the regulars during times of emergency.

Given the proximity of both territories to the war zone, the presence of fortifications assumed some importance. Both bishoprics were well endowed with fortresses thanks to ambitious and expensive building programs begun in the 1650s. Wurzburg itself was (and still is) dominated by the Marienberg citadel, in addition to a fortified belt surrounding the town. These installations included barracks for up to 3,700 soldiers and a mililary hospital with 190 beds. Additional space was provided by the smaller Konigshofen fortress, while the barracks at Kitzingen could accommodate a further 1,000 men. [7]

In contrast, Bamberg city was relatively poorly defended. though the bishopric possessed relatively modern works at Kronach and Forchhiem. Though all these defences provided secure refuge against the Prussian raids, they were militarily defective and increasingly obsolete. Their main value was in relieving the burden of billeting the soldiers on the civilian population, a feature which marked both Wurzburg and Bamberg out from larger states like Austria and Prussia.

Active Service 1757 to 1763

The service of the two Wurzburg auxiliary regiments was distinct from that of the contingents with the Franconian field forces. The cavalry and infantry companies from Wurzburg and Bamberg were scattered among the five Franconian regiments in keeping with the Circle's policy of spreading the danger of active service equally amongst the member territories (see Appendix C). Thus, the contingents shared the varied fortunes of the Franconians in general, as they, along with the Swabians, continued to provide the backbone of the imperial army until the end of 1762.

The other Wurzburg and Bamberg units acted as home defence forces, guarding the fortresses and escorting recruits to the front. They saw little direct action during the Prussian attacks because the Franconians preferred to retreat in order to collect their forces, whereupon the raiders withdrew before they could be caught by superior numbers.

The experience of the auxiliary regiments was considerably different. Though the problems associated with its formation delayed its departure, the Red, or Rot Wurzburg regiment had already joined the Austrian army in Bohemia before the Prussians raided Franconia in May 1757. The Blue, or Blau Regiment had to be diverted to help counter this threat and so accompanied the imperial army on its march towards Saxony. Both regiments thus shared the respective fates of the forces to which they were attached, with the Red Regiment losing 24 officers and 755 men killed or captured during its defence of the churchyard at Leulhen. while the Blue Regiment suffered 291 casualtics and prisoners at Rossbach.

In 1758 the second battalion of the Blue Regiment was in Eger in Bohemia, while the other continued to be part of the nominal Austrian contingent with the imperial army. In August 1759 most of the first battalion was captured, prompting the Austrians to release the other battalion for service in thc field in the following campaign.[8] It was joined by the Rcd Regiment which had continued to serve with the main Austrian army (1758-59) and had been present at the battle of Hochkirch.

The heavy losses of both units, amounting to 99 officers and 1,303 men in 1759 alone, were placing an increasing strain on Wurzburg's limited resources, and Seinsheim began pressing the Austrians to amalgamate them as a single regiment entitled Kaiserlich Wurzburg. [9] While the third battalion remained in Eger as a depot, the other two battalions served with the Austro-imperial army operating in Saxony in 1761 and 1762, including the battle of Freiberg.

Late in 1762 the field elements were sent to the Austrian Netherlands (modern day Belgium and Luxembourg) as part of a vain effort to seize Prussian territory in Westphalia hefore it could be returned to Frederick the Great by France, under the terms of the recent Peace of Paris with Great Britain. The Peace of Hubertusburg put an end to all such attempts and the regiment was formally discharged from service on February 24, 1763. It arrived back home in April, followed in June by the prisoners released by the Prussians.

The End of the Wurzburg and Bamberg Armies

Thereafter, the Wurzburgers saw no action until a later bishop provided 2,000 auxiliaries for the Austrians in 1790. Along with the Bambergers, contingents continued to serve with the Austrian and imperial armies until the last formal imperial war effort ended in 1801. During this latter conflict, the French bombarded and captured the Marienberg citadels causing considerable damage in January 1801. As the Empire began to fragment, Bavarian troops moved into both territories with prior French approval. Bamberg and the bulk of Wurzburg were incorporated into Bavaria and the servicable elements of their forces became part of that electorate's army.

Appendices A, B, C

Footnotes