The significance of any changes in the conduct of warfare in the Napoleonic Wars can only be fully appreciated with an understanding of the events in the wars in the later part of the eighteenth century. As such, these two books, aimed at the undergraduate history student, complement each other. Both are written by leading experts in their field, and both are highly informative and useful primers.

The Wars of Frederick the Great

Showalter's first chapter is an excellent account of the socio-economic rationale of the Prussian army under Frederick. It is a basic point in the study of military history that armies are the product of the society of which they are part. The soldier of the standing armies of the eighteenth century was highly trained, needed a clear and disciplined system in which he would function and was simply too expensive to be allowed to desert. Society would have to change before high levels of desertion would not destroy the fabric of the army; indeed, it is arguable if high levels of desertion could be tolerated by any army at any time. Another issued addressed in the opening chapter is the motivation of Frederick's soldiery, which Showalter describes as being 'composed, by and large, of men willing to fight under conditions other than the immediate defence of their own homes'. In all, the desertion rate of the Prussian army was under two per cent per annum, a very modest level.

Military Discipline

On the question of military discipline, which certain twentieth century writers of popular faction exaggerate, Showalter makes a number of pertinent points, including 'On a more practical level, even the rawest and most arrogant of subalterns was unlikely to rejoice at the prospect of marching into battle in front of a hundred loaded muskets carried by men who hated him.' He continues: 'Without attempting to whitewash Frederician discipline, many vivid accounts of the system's horrors were composed by officers who favoured a discipline based on honour and mutual respect, or soldiers who perceived themselves as having been enlisted by guile or force'. Finally: 'The clumsy, awkward, or unwilling soldier in an eighteenth-century line of battle could endanger his comrades more then himself'. In Frederick's army, discipline was no harsher than anywhere else in the eighteenth century, and, in fact, the local recruiting made through the canton system probably allowed the Prussians to be less strict than certain of their contemporaries.

Showalter's narrative and account of the wars fought by Frederick the Great make it clear that the main reason that this great captain was a military success was not so much any tactical skill on the field of battle, but rather the refusal to give up after set backs. Frederick's tactical innovations are discussed, such use the use of three ranks instead of the then customary four, first introduced as a temporary measure and later by regulation. The myth of the oblique order is examined in some detail and is shown to have been more of an accident than design. The use of the cadence, or marching in step, on the field of battle is also examined. The first uses of concentrated artillery fire, the grand battery, are dealt with, as is the first use of horse artillery. The tactical innovations of Frederick's enemies are also discussed. The great discomfort caused to Frederick's troops by the Austrian light infantry is made apparent, and the first tentative uses as the column as a battlefield formation are mentioned. The fundamental fault in Frederick's system of command, the absence of any permanent structure above the regimental level, is pointed out.

For much of his book, Showalter's analysis is clear and informative, with several popular myths on his army being shown for what they are. However, towards the end of the work, when dealing with the later years of Frederick's reign, he looses some of his otherwise sharp focus. Frederick's army had suffered heavily from the mosquito stings of the Croats, and he certainly paid attention to the matter of light infantry.

However, Showalter appears to think that he regarded light infantry 'as useless', which is not the entire story. It is somewhat inconsistent for Showalter, having devoted space to refuting the claim that Frederick's men feared their officers more than the enemy, to suddenly seem to think that after 1763, when the Enlightenment was influencing thinking throughout the Prussian army and when it was becoming more liberal in its outlook, this did become the case. It is a shame that Showalter supports Clausewitz's claim that 'the Prussian musket was the worst firearm in Europe', claiming that even Scharnhorst held a similar view. In the days when you aimed your battalion, and not your musket, the Prussian musket was as good as any in Europe. If this musket was really so bad, then how come the Prussians had the highest rate of fire in Europe, and how come Gudin's Division at Hassenhausen suffered such a high rate of casualties?

For understandable reasons, Showalter refers largely to modern English-language publications; this does not stop him citing the standard German works, and listing them for further reading. In short, a commendable work, informative not only for the student of eighteenth century history, but essential background reading for the student of the Napoleonic era.

Book Review: The Wars of Napoleon

To sum up, these works achieve their aim of providing the undergraduate student with a basic primer with which to study the subject. This reviewer found Showalter's work the more useful and informative, and Esdaile's is probably the best primer on the subject available in the English language.

This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com