The Battle of Talavera was a tactical victory for the Allies, especially the Bntish. They had retained the field and inflicted 7268 casualties as compared to 5365 for themselves. However Wellesley had to sacrifice the tactical victory in the face of the greater strategic imperative of saving his army. Whilst the British maintained an army in the Peninsula the French would have to retain effective concentrations of forces ready to counter any aggressive moves on the part of the Bntish. When the French were concentrated to oppose the British they left the country open to the guerrillas.
Later on, when the threat from the British in a particular area had diminished they could disperse, but would have to re-pacify the areas they had relinquished. This is what happened in the north when Soult came south to cut Wellesley's communications with Portugal. Preservation of the army in the Peninsula was the long term strategic threat that the British posed to the French occupation of Spain. Wellesley undoubtedly understood this even if the bungling of his Spanish allies hindered his efforts. So much could have been achieved, but delay upon delay had given the French time to first counter Wellesley's plan to trap Victor and then thwart the thrust towards Madrid.
Later, when Soult was sitting on his communications with Portugal, the defence of which was still his main objective, his army was without supplies and he had an increasing lack of faith in his Spanish allies. What choice did he have but to bring his army back to a secure base where it could be supplied and continue in existence as an effective force threatening the French?
Another factor in his calculations would have been the implications of Napoleon's Victory over the Austrians at Wagram on the 5/6 July which lead to the collapse of the Fifth Coalition. This battle, fought some three weeks before Talavera, was the culmination of a campaign that had kept the Emperor and many French troops out of Spain for over six months. Although definite news from central Europe would take time to arrive in Spain Wellesley had to take account of the possible defeat of the Austnans. If Napoleon and the thousands of troops involved were available for operations in Spain, Wellesley would have to prepare his defences carefully.
However lessons had been learnt. Depending on the Spanish for supplies was asking for trouble. Henceforth Wellesley developed his own supply system which with a few notable exceptions, such as the retreat from Burgos in late 1812, would prove effective. Co-operation with the Spanish field armies was also a doubtful enterprise. Not until he had been made their commander-in-chief in 1813 and had been able to rectify some of the major deficiencies did he put any faith in them. His own army had on the whole performed well; British linear tactics had proved superior to French Column tactics and would do so time and again, but there was room for improvement. Being caught without proper pickets, chasing a repulsed enemy without thought to possible counter-attacks and sloppy staff work would not be tolerated. Much work on bringing his army up the standards required would be necessary before he would test it in battle again at Busaco 14 months later.
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