Joseph and Jourdan wanted to pull back and await Soult's arrival on the British rear, then move forward and catch them between two forces. Marshall Victor wanted to try again that day. Fail this time and he would 'give up making war'[16] ; an outburst he would regret later when his colleagues unmercifully asked him when he was going to retire. Victor's determined demands finally forced Joseph to order another attack.

Meanwhile, on the Medellin, Wellesley could see the preparations for this attack. He realised that it would be in great force and along on a broad front from the Medellin south past the Pajar. Worrying also was movement north of the Cascajal. He needed re-enforcements and the only ones available were Spanish. Cuesta for once responded speedily. A division of infantry, Bassecour's, and another of cavalry, Albuquerque's, moved around the Medellin.

They took up position, the infantry on the slopes of the mountains, the cavalry with Anson's light brigade, on the plain, where they were soon joined by Fane's heavy brigade. The Spanish brought two guns that were placed with Rettberg's on the northern slopes of the Medellin, commanding the plain between the hill and the mountains.

At about 1 p.m. the French artillery opened fire with 80 guns at the Allied line between the Pajar and Medellin. Sebastiani's 4th corps and Lapisse's division from Victor's Ist corps, were marching towards the Portina Brook. Laval's division of the 4th corps, mostly comprising German troops, was the first to make contact with Campbell's division around the Pajar at about 1:15 pm. Campbell had a battery of three-pounders deployed near the stone farm house that sits on the hillock. Four Spanish twelve-pounders joined them just in time. The British skirmishers did not do so well this time and were quickly pushed back; some companies were almost captured. As the men of Laval's division emerged from the rough ground into the open area in front of the Pajar they were unable to reform into formation before the Allied artillery opened fire on them. They were probably in the same three column, three battalion formations used in the earlier attack on the Medellin. The southern column was met by a spirited fire from Spanish infantry while the one to the north was greeted by two British battalions in line. The centre column was pounded by the British and Spanish guns along with volleys from another British battalion, it was the first French column to break. The northern column soon followed and the southern one gradually retreated. Campbell's men quickly pursued and captured all the divisional artillery that had been brought along to support the attack; it had not been allowed time to fire a shot. The British returned to their positions in triumph.

Whilst this attack had been taking place, another bigger one was directed towards Sherbrooke's division positioned just to the north of Campbell. At about 1:30 p.m. the French, some 15,000 strong, came on in 12 separate columns.

The columns comprised two battalions, one behind the other. Each battalion had a front of 30 men and was 15 ranks deep. About 500 yards separated the two battalions in the column and there was about 120 yards between each column. In front of the columns was a mass of skirmishers. When the first French battalions crossed the Portina brook, at their moment of greatest disorganisation, Sherbrooke's 6,000 men moved forward to meet them. The British had deployed into a line two-man deep, divided into 12 sections, each positioned at the head of a French column. This appears to have been organised without regard to battalion formation.

The British could use all 6000 muskets, the French only about 1300. The British volleys thundered out and the French columns started to sink into confusion. Attempts were made to deploy into line so more muskets could be used, but deploying under heavy fire is difficult if not impossible. Each column broke and turned for the rear with the British in hot pursuit. One brigade, Cameron's, stopped just over the Portina, the other three brigades in the division, the Guards and two K.G.L. charged recklessly on.

The retreating French battalions passed through their second line which was marching forward, it in turn met, and repulsed the British. Now it was the turn of the British to turn and flee, they rushed back closely pursued by French infantry. Camerons's brigade tried to hold position but were prevented from firing by the mass of retreating infantry between them and the enemy. Soon they too, joined the retreat. With French cavalry and artillery forming up to take advantage of the hole left in the British line the cnsis of the battle was at hand. If the centre was breached the battle was as good as lost and badly lost at that.

Wellesley had been observing the French attack from the Medellin. All seemed to be going well, until the 1st Division's reckless pursuit. Wellesley quickly recognised a potential disaster in the making and took appropriate action. He could not send more troops from the Medellin because the French were preparing fbr yet another attempt on it. So he sent one battalion from the hill, the 2/48th, the strongest in his army. Mackenzie was moved forward with the 2/24th, 2/31st and the 1/24th to link with the 48th. Cotton's light cavalry was also moved nearer the line. 10,000 French soldiers were advancing towards a hastily prepared defence by some 3000 British. The retreating British troops were allowed to pass through and then the ranks of the four battalions quickly reformed to confront the enemy.

At a distance of no more than 50 yards the first volley roared out, quickly followed by platoon volleys. Firing by platoons caused a ripple effect. Each company was split into two platoons for firing in battle, after the first masses' volley the soldiers reloaded and stood ready to fire. The platoon on the right of the line fired and then started to reload, the next in line would then make ready, present and fire and so on down the line. For the first furious few minutes each platoon would fire once every 15 seconds or so after which soldiers became fatigued and muskets fouled. The French would be under a constant roaring fire that gave no respite or mercy. After those few terrible minutes the attackers would usually be a confused mass of dead, wounded or retreating men.

The Guards, now heavily depleted by their rash advance, had rallied behind the four battalions and returned to add their muskets to the firing line. Cameron's brigade and the K.G.L. also rallied and fired into each flank. The French columns on the north of the advance could take no more and broke, quickly followed by those in the centre and south who had also been charged by Cotton's cavalry. The French streamed back in confusion but this time the pursuit was checked at the Portina brook. French Dragoons were waiting on the other side for any opportunity to cut down impetuous British troops. The line had held, thanks to Wellesley's foresight and prompt action, not to mention the steadfastness of those four battalions.

Part 6: July 28th 2 p.m.

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