Sir Arthur Wellesley had returned to Portugal on 22nd April 1809. His victories at Rolica and Vimeiro and the political sour grapes of the Convention of Cintra were behind him. He now commanded the combined Anglo-Portuguese army numbering some 36,000 men and was charged by the British Government with defending Portugal. Marshal Soult held Oporto and operated in the north of the country with 20,000 men, while Marshal Victor threatened central Portugal with a slightly bigger army based around Merida just over the border in Spain.

In a campaign remarkable for its daring, speed and skill, Wellesley recovered Oporto and pushed Soult out of northern Portugal; the Marshal losing most of his guns and equipment in the process. Moore and the retreat to Corunna had been avenged.

Now Wellesley was moving to deal with the threat from Victor, whose unsupported forward position at Merida was inviting a two-pronged thrust, Wellesley from the north and a Spanish army under Cuesta from the south. Wellesley had sent a letter to Cuesta and the Supreme Junta suggesting such a campaign from Oporto on May 22nd. The Spanish not only agreed but offered to feed the army and provide transport for it while in Spain. British troops began marching towards the Spanish border. However, before he crossed into Spain Wellesley had three problems to be overcome:

1. He needed money in Portuguese dollars to pay his army's debts.

He had been assured that the military chest contained 400,000 pounds, but when he arrived in Portugal he discovered that it only held 120,000 pounds. At the end of April Sir John Craddock was sent to Cadiz with 100,000 pounds in Spanish gold to change into Portuguese dollars. However, to Wellesley's frustration he had not yet returned.

At the end of May Wellesley's finances were reaching crisis point. The French would not have had money problems, since they generally overcame payment difficulties by using the point of a bayonet! Paying the troops was well down their list of priorities. It was a policy that had been successful so far in central Europe but it was to lead to disaster in the Peninsula and Russia. Eventually it would be a major factor in Napoleon's defeat.

Wellesley was well aware of what would ensue if a British army attempted to live off the land. The hatred of the local populace would be turned upon them. Without their co-operation, the army would soon be cut off, starving and open to attack by the far more numerous French. The British army's survival depended on the Portuguese and Spanish belief that they would be paid for everything it used. Besides, from what we know of Wellesley, the thought of his troops marauding around the countryside in search of food and more likely drink would be anathema to him.

2. Permission to enter Spain.

His original instructions from the British Government had been for the defence of Portugal. 'The defence of Portugal you will consider as the first and immediate object of your attention.' [2] An expedition into Spain, no matter how desirable, required government approval. Britain only had a small army and Wellesley had to do all in his power to preserve his part of it. At this stage of the war a defeat, or even a costly victory, would have been received with howls of anguish by the politicians back in London. The unfortunate Walcheren expedition, currently embarking to disaster, was to be proof of this. The recall of the army with the abandonment of Portugal and Spain was an event Wellesley had always to guard against.

3. An agreed plan of action with Cuesta.

Wellesley had been in lengthy correspondence with Cuesta tbr some weeks, in contrast to the abilities of the French to communicate with each other in the face of a growing guerrilla movement. Cuesta preferred a drive on Madrid, Wellesley a pincer movement against Victor. The two generals were an unknown quantity to one another.

Wellesley was just 40 years old, very fit; successful campaigns in India, Denmark and Portugal lay behind him.

Cuesta was 69 years old and had just been badly defeated by Victor at the battle of Medellin. To add to his problems his own cavalry had ridden over him. Unlike another old soldier, Blucher at Ligny, he did not recover well and had to be lifted into a coach and supported when on horseback. He did however want to fight, preferably a 'great battle'. Wellesley commented that he 'would not hear of any proposal of mine ... to move the Enemy from Madrid by Manoeuvre.' [3]

It did not help that John Hookham Frere, the British minister to Spain, had been conspiring to have Cuesta replaced by Albuquerque. He was also attempting to have Wellesley appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies. Wellesley's knowledge of these moves was patchy and his attitude to pushing the subject with the Spanish Government was at best lukewarm. Cuesta knew all about them and understandably did not like it; a perfect recipe for mutual co-operation and understanding!

On June 10th Wellesley learned that Cuesta had agreed to a plan entailing the encirclement of Victor between the rivers Tagus and Guadiana. At about the same time he received permission to enter Spain along with welcome news of reinforcements; the light brigade under Craufurd was on the way. Unfortunately he still had no money. On 25th June it arrived at long last. 'I have the pleasure to inform you that the army will march tomorrow morning,...the advance guard will be at Zara la Mayor on the 2nd July.' Wellesley to Bourke who was with Cuesta. [4]

It was too late. Victor had blown up the fort at Merida on 14th June and retreated over the Tagus River towards the forces of King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan near Madrid. He was responding to orders from King Joseph, who was reacting to Soult's expulsion from northern Portugal.

Victor's army was now positioned around the three Tagus river crossings at Almaraz, Arzobispo and Talavera. Wellesley's original plan for encircling Victor between himself and Cuesta had failed due to delay upon delay. For one reason or another, the first great opportunity of the campaign had been lost.

Part 2: July 3rd to July 26

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